



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

the place of the survival of the fittest in the organic sphere" (p. 460). On the other hand, "society generalizes what the individual has already particularized" (p. 466). It follows that "the real progress of society is measured, not by the individual's particularizations directly, but by society's generalizations" (p. 471), and "the advance on the social side, thus tested and measured, must result in a constant suppression of the individual's sanctions, as far as they remain in conflict with those of society" (p. 473).

The path of social progress is thus determined. "Only when both these conditions are fulfilled—when old social matter is particularized by an individual and then again generalized by society—can new accretions be normally made to the social content, and progress be secured to the organization as a whole" (p. 511). But, since the social generalization becomes, when particularized, the moral ideal of the individual, it further follows that the social progress which is mediated by this particularization "is necessarily in the direction of the realization of ethical standards and rules of conduct" (p. 519). Yet a final ethical conflict between the individual and society is admitted. "The final and irreducible antagonism of society" is "that in the ethical realm the individual may rule himself by rules which are in advance of those which society prescribes, and also exact them. This is common, not only with the moral seer, but in the life of us all" (p. 540). This conflict "is soluble only by the actual growth of society itself in the particular case, or by the suppression of the individual who revolts. And society solves it only to renew it always" (p. 544).

It is impossible here to discuss the many questions raised by Professor Baldwin in the course of this inquiry. The aim has rather been to call attention to the importance of the inquiry itself, conducted as it is with admirable patience, fulness of information, and skill in the scientific interpretation of the elusive phenomena of the mental life. If the reader is not persuaded, he is at all events provided with important materials for a decision, and he cannot fail to gain a good deal of fresh insight, as well as great stimulus to further thought, from the study of the volume.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

JAMES SETH.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE MORAL INSTINCT. By Alexander Sutherland. Two volumes. London: Longmans, 1898.

In this work Mr. Sutherland, already known in Australia as a geographer and colonial historian, comes before the wider English-

speaking public as an ethical writer. We cordially welcome his book, not only for its intrinsic value, but as an indication of the growth of thought in Greater Britain. We have already a young Australian school of painting; let us hope that before long we shall have an Australian school of philosophy.

The general plan of the work is as follows: Beginning with the lower forms of life, such as fish, the author remarks that among those species which take no care of their young an enormous and wasteful fertility is requisite to maintain the species. This huge fertility absorbs a great deal of the parents' vitality and stands in the way of all progress. But when fish begin to take care of their young, a vastly diminished progeny suffices for race-preservation and allows opportunity for the development of general intelligence. The same reasoning is applied to the higher animals. The higher they are, the more marked is their parental care. This operates for progress in two ways: firstly, by lessening the drain of reproduction on the parents; secondly, by allowing the offspring a longer childhood, during which their mental faculties may develop and ripen far beyond the level of the humbler and quicker-maturing species.

It is in warm-blooded creatures that parental care begins to undergo a change of the most far-reaching character. From mere instinctive attention it transforms itself into conscious solicitude, in other words, into sympathy. Now, sympathy, according to Mr. Sutherland, is the Moral Instinct. Thus parental solicitude, developed with increasing power as we ascend the stages of warm-blooded life, is the root of that conduct which in man we term morality.

The same line of reasoning is applied to mankind. The lowest races are marked by weak parental solicitude, high fertility, great infant mortality, early maturity of children, and defective education. The higher races are marked by strong parental solicitude with consequent improvement in all the other respects. The growth of sympathy is therefore a necessary condition not only of moral progress but of intellectual and material progress as well.

A similar argument is developed in regard to conjugal sympathy or love between spouses, and social sympathy or affectionate relations between neighbors and fellow-citizens. From these three forms of sympathy, parental, conjugal, and social, is formed the whole content of our morality. The sentiment of Duty is merely the systematization or standardizing of sympathy, moral enthusiasm

merely the admiration for the higher forms of sympathetic conduct. The latter part of the book is occupied with the author's views on responsibility (wherein he avows himself a mechanical determinist), on the relation of morality to law, and on the nervous basis of the emotions. This latter part appears to us to be of considerably less value than what precedes.

It will be seen that Mr. Sutherland's book deals only in a minor degree with moral philosophy in the usual sense of the term. Moral philosophy is the explanation of conduct as the judgment and act of a personal moral agent. But Mr. Sutherland is interested rather in setting forth the natural-history conditions of morality and with what may be called sociological ethics, or the study of the moral habits and institutions of societies. It is in the moral-philosophic part of the book that his argument is least convincing. For example, his "hard" determinism with its denial of responsibility in the ordinary sense is repellent enough in itself; but he makes it more unreasonable by following it up with a profession of subjective idealism (ch. xxiv.). He is quite innocent of the often demonstrated fact that hard determinism and subjective idealism are maintainable, each by itself, but are mutually destructive in combination. But his great mistake is to suppose that out of mere animal sympathy we can get such conceptions as duty, self-respect, or moral beauty. These imply an appreciation of good conduct as a thing admirable in itself, which mere sympathy can never give us. Again, the title of the work itself is surely a misnomer. By "moral instinct," as already explained, Mr. Sutherland means sympathy. Now sympathy, as he himself points out (vol. i. p. 18), may sometimes make us do wrong. Hence the curious result that the moral instinct may dictate what is immoral. We want, then, a further criterion to decide upon the morality of the moral instinct, and where this is to come from Mr. Sutherland does not tell us.

In the natural-historic and sociological parts of the book there are evidences of more careful study, and the results achieved are proportionately more valuable. In his general theory Mr. Sutherland bases himself on the solid foundation of Darwin, and much of the best of his writing is a working out of hints and outlines contained in the third and fifth chapters of the "*Descent of Man*." Some of the technical terms he has invented are both ingenious and useful. For example, "perihestic" morality is the morality which grows up round the family hearth between the members of

the same household ; while "aphestic" morality lies in the legal relations of fellow-citizens to each other.

It need hardly be said that even after Mr. Sutherland's labors there is still a great deal left for other workers in the same field. Up to the present time the subject of the historical development of morality has suffered the most extraordinary neglect. A glance at the bibliographies will verify this. In Mr. Fortescue's indexes from 1880-1895 there is only one work which pretends to be complete,—Letourneau's "*Évolution de la morale*,"—and not more than three or four German pamphlets. Nor is the deficiency made up by previous writers. Mr. Lecky's "*History of European Morals*," learned and interesting as far as it goes, is but a fragmentary study of one curious epoch. The historian of morality has in fact not yet appeared before the world, and a most magnificent literary and philosophic opportunity still remains unseized. Such facts as these are a sufficient answer to sceptics who ask whether, in view of the length of time that men have been philosophizing, there can be anything left for philosophy to do. The main problem may be briefly stated. In civilized society there is recognized a certain moral ideal, or norm of moral conduct, regulating all conduct concerned with family life, property, civic intercourse, the state, and so forth. Among savages we find a vastly different ideal, much more rudimentary and greatly different in its features. Now, how is this difference to be accounted for? For what reasons, by what processes, through what variations, under what influences, has this mighty change taken place in the most vitally interesting of all matters of human action? To this great question we have as yet nothing but fragments of an answer. For Mr. Sutherland's contribution, welcome though it be, cannot claim to be more than an instalment of the whole.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS, AS BASED ON THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Translated by A. E. Kroeger, edited by the Hon. Dr. W. T. Harris, Commissioner of Education. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1897. Pp. xii., 399.

It is difficult to imagine what can justify the publication of such a book as this. So far as mere familiarity with German is concerned, Mr. Kroeger would, indeed, seem to be sufficiently equipped